NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that allies must allocate at least €1 billion monthly for American weapons for Ukraine through the PURL mechanism (Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List). According to Rutte, total expenditures could reach €15 billion per year. Europe and Canada have already begun increasing their contributions: over the last four months, they have totaled approximately €4 billion, aligning with previously established plans.
While this target sounds ambitious, it masks a complex political game fraught with serious financial and political risks. The main question remains whether EU countries can sustain this pace, especially given internal budget disagreements and the urgent need to increase their own military spending to meet Alliance obligations.
The issue is not a shortage of funds; the EU’s nominal GDP in 2025 is estimated to be around €18–19 trillion. The amounts directed towards supporting Ukraine are massive but not catastrophic for the European economy as a whole. The primary danger, instead, is political fragmentation. Europe’s capacity to assist Kyiv in 2026 hinges on three key factors: whether EU leaders agree on utilizing frozen Russian assets, whether European defense industry can scale up production, and, most crucially, whether Europeans can overcome “political fatigue” regarding the war.
How Does the PURL Mechanism Work?
PURL (Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List) serves as a “fast button” for weapons procurement. Several EU nations (including Germany, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, the Baltic states, and Scandinavia), alongside Canada, allocate funds to purchase ready-made weaponry directly from US stockpiles. This streamlined process allows equipment to reach the front lines within weeks. The focus is on high-tech equipment whose production capacity in Europe is currently limited or requires excessive lead time.
The system was launched in the summer of 2024 as insurance against the “freezing” of direct US aid due to political disputes in Washington and concerns over corruption in Ukraine. NATO has thus transformed from a political coordinator into a “procurement agent,” dedicated to establishing an uninterrupted supply chain sourced from the United States.
The Deep Rift Among Allies
Despite Rutte’s determination to reach monthly spending targets in the billions for American weapons, a clear crisis is emerging within both NATO and the EU:
☛ The White House, in its new “National Security Strategy,” clearly indicated that it does not view the European Union as an equal partner and is reluctant to “synchronize watches” on matters of global security generally, and Ukraine specifically.
The US is willing to supply weapons as long as it is paid and deems the delivery expedient. However, Donald Trump and his team have already signaled that their primary goal is to end the war entirely. Should the US cease selling weapons to Ukraine, Europe would be left without alternatives. Furthermore, judging by the current PURL system, the “European Defense White Paper” (the ReArm Europe military self-sufficiency plan promoted by European Commissioner Andrius Kubilius) is “not even one-third written.” EU chief diplomat Kaja Kallas acknowledged in early December that the initiative to provide Ukraine with 2 million rounds of ammunition in 2026 has yet to be realized.
In addition to technological shortcomings, the bloc is riddled with political disputes:
☛ Hungary has officially refused to contribute funds. Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto called the Ukrainian leadership a “military mafia” and stated that Budapest would not spend “a single cent of taxpayer money” on the war.
☛ Italy has adopted a wait-and-see approach. Rome is not joining the PURL program, hoping for an imminent start to peace negotiations.
☛ Belgium is blocking the use of frozen Russian assets for loans to Ukraine. The Belgian Prime Minister fears colossal lawsuits from Russia and a reduction in the country’s credit rating.
☛ The European Central Bank (ECB) refused to guarantee repayment on a €140 billion loan, thus complicating Brussels’ implementation of a key funding scheme.
☛ Plan B (an emergency non-repayable grant to Ukraine), proposed by the European Commission, is also in doubt. Hungary officially rejected the Commission’s proposal to issue Eurobonds to finance the next aid package for Ukraine.
Against this backdrop, a phrase that was highly popular among European officials in early 2025—“500 million Europeans are begging 340 million Americans to protect them from 140 million Russians who, after three years of war, have failed to defeat 38 million Ukrainians”—no longer seems like an ironic joke. It exposes the core problem: despite possessing colossal demographic and economic superiority, Europe has failed over four years to convert its resources into real power. Instead of becoming a sovereign actor dictating the terms of peace, the Old World remains hostage to the will of others.
What Should Europe Do?
What should Europe do when the US is conspicuously turning away from it, while the Kremlin regularly flexes its muscles through hybrid attacks? The Old World must wake up and realize that the billions flowing across the ocean via the PURL system cannot substitute for the lack of its own political will.
Ultimately, the EU’s current strategy appears to be an attempt to buy time rather than solve the underlying problem. Entering the fourth year of the war, the EU still lacks a clear diplomatic plan for achieving peace, and, even more dangerously, it lacks a thoroughly developed scenario for the eventuality that NATO’s Article 5 turns out to be merely a formality. Paying for someone else’s security is easier than ensuring your own, but in 2026, this choice could prove fatal for Europe.
