Today marks the fourth anniversary of the **Russia-Ukraine war** following the full-scale invasion, a day when global diplomacy proved powerless against the aggression of a modern-day “fuhrer.”
In this special report, we examine why the West ignored precise intelligence warnings, how the Kremlin used the UN Security Council as a smokescreen for its invasion, and whether diplomacy has any chance of stopping the war today.
The UN Smokescreen in the Russia-Ukraine War
On February 23, 2022, in New York (when the morning of the 24th had already arrived in Kyiv), the UN Security Council convened for its second emergency meeting in 24 hours. While diplomats issued routine calls for de-escalation along Ukraine’s borders, Vladimir Putin was launching his “special military operation” on live television.
Russia, which held the Council presidency, chaired the session requested by Ukraine. Permanent Representative Vasily Nebenzya began with scripted accusations, blaming Kyiv for once again “whipping up hysteria” and claiming the West was artificially dramatizing the situation. He spoke of “protecting Donbas” from Ukrainian “military adventures.” According to him, Russia only wanted to prevent the destruction of the so-called LPR and DPR by Ukrainian forces. Even in response to UN Secretary-General António Guterres’s appeal to “give peace a chance,” Nebenzya flatly stated that de-escalation was only possible if Ukraine stopped shelling territories that the Kremlin had already recognized as Russian.
The Moment of Truth
The turning point came suddenly. As Nebenzya read a prepared statement on “peaceful intentions,” Putin’s video address spread across social media and news feeds. Ukrainian Permanent Representative Sergiy Kyslytsya took the floor and addressed the chair directly: “About 45 minutes ago, your president declared war on Ukraine. Can you confirm this right now?“
Nebenzya fell silent, staring at his phone—evidently receiving instructions or reading the news. Emerging from this digital pause, he no longer denied the attack but immediately established a rigid terminological framework: “This is not called a war. It is called a special military operation in Donbas.“
He read excerpts from Putin’s address, explaining that the goals were “demilitarization and denazification” rather than occupation. When Kyslytsya remarked that “there is no purgatory for war criminals; they go straight to hell,” Nebenzya’s tone shifted from diplomatic to ideological. It was at this moment that he effectively admitted the process had been launched and there was no returning to discussions of a “diplomatic solution.”
Four years later, in an interview with the BBC, Kyslytsya recalled that until 10:00 PM, they were assured there were no plans for an attack. When asked to call Foreign Minister Lavrov to stop the madness, Nebenzya calmly replied: “I am not going to wake anyone up.” The Russian diplomat believed that while the Kremlin launched its strikes, their president could sleep peacefully. Judging by this 40-minute transition from denial to admission, even officials of such high rank may not have known the exact hour the catastrophe would begin.
A Global Crisis of Trust
Until the very last moment, many Western countries and the Ukrainian authorities themselves did not believe a full-scale war would break out. A recent investigation by The Guardian reveals how the world missed this “Great Gambit.” The CIA and MI6 had precise plans for the seizure of Kyiv as early as 2020, but Washington hit a wall of skepticism from its allies. According to international reports, the reasons for this doubt were deeply human: Paris and Berlin remembered the flawed US intelligence regarding Iraq in 2003. “I am old enough to remember 2003,” one European minister told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at the time.
Analysts in Paris and Berlin viewed Putin as a rational actor. They calculated mathematically that a 200,000-strong force was physically insufficient to occupy a country of 40 million where 10% of the population was expected to resist. The troop concentration was seen not as a preparation for an attack, but as a tool for blackmail.
The Kremlin’s hermetic secrecy also had a major impact. Secrecy was so intense that many high-ranking Russian officials remained unaware of the attack until the final week. This misled the Ukrainian leadership: communications between Yermak and Kozak created an illusion of peace because the Russian negotiators themselves sincerely did not believe an invasion was coming.
Inside Ukraine, the situation turned dramatic. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly dismissed the warnings to avoid an economic collapse triggered by panic, while military leadership under Valeriy Zaluzhnyi worked in secret to prepare the army for the inevitable.
Ultimately, while European diplomats dismissed the “Anglo-Saxon” warnings as nonsense, the Kremlin’s war machine had already moved into position, proving those who bet on intelligence data rather than political logic were right.
Western Caution, Fearing to “Anger Putin,” Only Emboldened the Kremlin
Years later, European diplomacy is reluctantly acknowledging its errors. Former NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg stated in an interview with the Financial Times: “If Ukraine had received more weapons before the war, perhaps it would have prevented the war or made what Russia did much more difficult.”
Instead, a silent “embargo” followed the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and aid was limited to items that would not “provoke” Moscow. For a long time, most Western allies—with the exception of Poland, Lithuania, Czechia, and partially the US—wanted to help in a way that would not “anger Putin.”
This caution only whetted the Kremlin’s appetite. Numerous rounds of negotiations to end the war over the years led nowhere—they became a formality used by Moscow to regroup its forces. The clearest example of indecision remains the issue of closing the sky. Since the early days, Kyiv has requested a no-fly zone or powerful air defense systems to neutralize Russia’s aerial advantage. Yet allies do not listen. The West continues to balance: providing just enough so that Ukraine does not lose, while refusing to take steps that would ensure a swift victory.
The truth is that the Kremlin currently has nothing to offer—it is impossible to bargain with. Russia does not need to be “convinced”; it must be forced to stop the war. Until the West takes a decisive step—such as a real no-fly zone or the total financial strangulation of the elites—Moscow will continue the slaughter.
The Outcome of Four Years of the Russia-Ukraine War
Today, the reality for Russia looks catastrophic. Throughout 2025, the Russian Federation captured less than 1% of Ukrainian territory, and the front has turned into a prolonged phase of attrition. According to estimates from Western think tanks (such as CSIS), total Russian losses (killed and wounded) could reach 1.2 million by early 2026, with approximately 325,000 fatalities. Instead of “rolling back NATO,” Finland and Sweden are now members of the Alliance.
Europe continues to declare it will stand with Ukraine until victory. But it is time to admit that the era of diplomatic concessions is over. A retrospective look at the events of 2021-2022 offers a bitter answer: diplomacy never had a theoretical chance. While Western capitals searched for rational arguments and compromise formulas, a process was already underway in the Kremlin that had nothing to do with the logic of gain. Today, history is repeating itself: attempts to “bring the parties to the table” without changing the balance of power on the battlefield are an illusion.
The diplomacy of the future is not about finding a “mutually acceptable option” that does not exist, but about creating conditions for the Kremlin (beyond just sanctions) where aggression becomes physically impossible. Only when the military and economic costs neutralize the political ambitions of the collective Putin will diplomacy receive its first real chance.