The European Union is expanding. Is this a negative development for the bloc, or ultimately a positive one? Remarks made by European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos before and after the informal meeting of European ministers held on September 4 in Ireland have failed to bring clarity to the debate.
Her statements were intended to project confidence and highlight momentum in the European Commission’s enlargement agenda. Upon closer examination, however, her rhetoric revealed conceptual contradictions, logical inconsistencies, and shifted definitions. What was presented as an effort to explain the accession process in plain terms ended up resembling political talking points that offer little substantive clarity. NEWSROOM IN conducted a critical analysis of Marta Kos’s arguments.
Substituting Process Activity for Concrete Results
Marta Kos: “This autumn will be an autumn of enlargement on two tracks. First, preparing the candidate countries for membership. Second, what we are doing inside the European Union to prepare for this. 2026 has already become a record year. This year we have done more than in any year over the past 25 years. And we can do even more. Some candidate countries could conclude negotiations by the end of this decade.”
The problem with this statement: In reality, not a single new member state has acceded to the EU. Here, “progress” is measured not by tangible outcomes—such as the actual accession of new members—but by bureaucratic output: the volume of meetings, working papers, negotiations, and regulatory reviews. An increase in administrative activity is being portrayed as a historic milestone for the enlargement process itself.
Moreover, framing these efforts around “two tracks” obscures a fundamental structural dilemma:
- To admit new members, the EU must first reform its own governance mechanisms (such as moving away from the unanimity principle in decision-making).
- Amending those governance rules requires the unanimous consent of all 27 current member states.
- Substantive institutional reforms remain blocked by member states, while ambiguity persists over which countries will ultimately join and under what conditions.
Cause and effect are inverted: an “autumn of enlargement” is declared an imminent reality even though the essential institutional preconditions have not yet been addressed.
Safeguarding Against Authoritarianism via a Legal Paradox
Marta Kos: “Today we will discuss how to prepare our European Union for the arrival of new member states… The third point will focus on safeguards. We will discuss what next-generation safeguards we could introduce to ensure that new member states uphold democratic principles and the rule of law after accession, for the next five, 10, 15 years.”
The problem with this statement: The concept of “next-generation safeguards” designed to ensure that newly admitted states adhere to democratic standards 5 to 15 years after accession runs into a legal dead end. A full EU member state enjoys sovereign voting authority and veto rights. Once a country enters the union, the European Commission retains very few effective enforcement mechanisms—as demonstrated by ongoing disputes involving Hungary and Poland. Imposing post-accession conditionality or oversight mechanisms on a sovereign member state wielding veto power remains legally and structurally incompatible with the EU’s current treaty architecture.
Diluting the Merit-Based Principle Under a New Label
Marta Kos: “And the fourth point will be gradual integration. There is a gap between geopolitical necessity and the merit-based approach, and we must bridge this gap. The merit-based principle in the context of enlargement means it takes time. So we will look at what new ways of gradual integration we should introduce to allow candidates to engage more closely with the EU before they become full members.”
The problem with this statement: Kos openly acknowledges a “gap between geopolitical necessity and the merit-based approach.” However, the merit-based principle has historically held a clear definition: a candidate state is granted membership status and full privileges only after meeting all accession criteria and aligning with the EU acquis.
By promoting “gradual integration”—granting sectoral access, single market entry, and funding allocations before benchmarks are fully met—the Commission is effectively recommending that the merit principle be softened in favor of geopolitical expediency. Rebranding a departure from fundamental accession rules as a “modernized application of meritocracy” merely masks a policy shift behind administrative jargon.
Translating Bureaucratic Jargon into Plain Terms
Several jurisdictions—such as New Zealand and Estonia—have codified plain language requirements into law (Plain Language Act 2022, Language Act). These legal frameworks require public officials to draft legislation and communicate policy decisions so that citizens can understand them without navigating obfuscating language.
Such speeches suggest that the European Commission would benefit from an equivalent approach. While EU enlargement continues primarily on paper, both European citizens and candidate countries require transparent assessments and clear timelines, rather than increasingly complex administrative formulations.
NEWSROOM IN has submitted formal inquiries to Marta Kos seeking substantive answers on several key issues:
1. On the Balance of Power and the Veto
- How does the European Commission plan to navigate veto players among member states? Transitioning from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) itself requires the unanimous approval of all 27 member states. Why would sovereign capitals (such as Budapest, Athens, or The Hague) willingly surrender their primary instrument of institutional leverage?
- Would admitting new members without reforming the veto mechanism risk complete paralysis in the EU’s common foreign and security policy?
2. On Institutional Resilience
- How will the EU manage budgetary reallocation? The accession of lower-income countries with large agrarian sectors would turn current net beneficiaries of cohesion funds (such as Poland, Portugal, and Spain) into net contributors. Are these capitals politically and economically prepared for this shift?
- What do “next-generation safeguards” entail in concrete legal terms? Once a country gains full voting rights in the Council of the EU, restricting its sovereign prerogatives without amending EU founding treaties is legally contentious. How does Brussels intend to prevent the emergence of new constitutional deadlocks?
3. On “Gradual Integration” and Meritocracy
- Does “gradual integration” create a tier of second-class member states? If candidate countries obtain access to the single market and structural funding without securing voting rights in decision-making bodies, does this risk entrenching a multi-speed Europe that marginalizes its periphery?
- What are the explicit key performance indicators (KPIs) governing this model? Where does the boundary lie between genuine phased integration and holding candidate nations indefinitely in a political waiting room?
4. On Geopolitical Risks and Security
- How does the EU intend to prevent the importation of unresolved territorial and ethnic disputes (in the Western Balkans or Eastern Europe) within its borders?
- How does enlargement align with European security architecture and NATO? Does the EU plan to offer candidate states credible security guarantees (Article 42.7 TEU) prior to accession, or will integration remain confined to regulatory alignment?
